Do Social Conditions Affect Capuchin Monkeys’ (Cebus apella) Choices in a Quantity Judgment Task? by Beran, Michael J. et al.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Language Research Center Language Research Center
2012
Do Social Conditions Affect Capuchin Monkeys’
(Cebus apella) Choices in a Quantity Judgment
Task?
Michael J. Beran
Georgia State University, mberan1@gsu.edu
Bonnie M. Perdue
Georgia State University, bperdue1@gsu.edu
Audrey E. Parrish
Theodore A. Evans
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/lrc_facpub
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Language Research Center at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Language Research Center by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beran, M. J., Perdue, B. M., Parrish, A. E., & Evans, T. A. (2012). Do social conditions affect capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) choices
in a quantity judgment task? Frontiers in Comparative Psychology, 3:492. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00492
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 16 November 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00492
Do social conditions affect capuchin monkeys’
(Cebus apella) choices in a quantity judgment task?
Michael J. Beran1*, Bonnie M. Perdue1, Audrey E. Parrish1,2 andTheodore A. Evans1
1 Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
2 Psychology Department, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Edited by:
Christian Agrillo, University of Padova,
Italy
Reviewed by:
Jessica Cantlon, University of
Rochester, USA
Marco Dadda, Università degli Studi
di Padova, Italy
*Correspondence:
Michael J. Beran, Language Research
Center, Georgia State University,
University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30302,
USA.
e-mail: mjberan@yahoo.com
Beran et al. (2012) reported that capuchin monkeys closely matched the performance of
humans in a quantity judgment test in which information was incomplete but a judgment
still had to be made. In each test session, subjects first made quantity judgments between
two known options. Then, they made choices where only one option was visible. Both
humans and capuchin monkeys were guided by past outcomes, as they shifted from select-
ing a known option to selecting an unknown option at the point at which the known option
went from being more than the average rate of return to less than the average rate of
return from earlier choices in the test session. Here, we expanded this assessment of
what guides quantity judgment choice behavior in the face of incomplete information to
include manipulations to the unselected quantity.We manipulated the unchosen set in two
ways: first, we showed the monkeys what they did not get (the unchosen set), anticipating
that “losses” would weigh heavily on subsequent trials in which the same known quantity
was presented. Second, we sometimes gave the unchosen set to another monkey, antic-
ipating that this social manipulation might influence the risk-taking responses of the focal
monkey when faced with incomplete information. However, neither manipulation caused
difficulty for the monkeys who instead continued to use the rational strategy of choosing
known sets when they were as large as or larger than the average rate of return in the
session, and choosing the unknown (riskier) set when the known set was not sufficiently
large. As in past experiments, this was true across a variety of daily ranges of quantities,
indicating that monkeys were not using some absolute quantity as a threshold for select-
ing (or not) the known set, but instead continued to use the daily average rate of return to
determine when to choose the known versus the unknown quantity.
Keywords: quantity judgments, uncertainty, social testing, competition, capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella
INTRODUCTION
Individuals from many species are commonly faced with mak-
ing decisions between two or more mutually exclusive options,
particularly when it comes to foraging decisions and the attempt
to maximize the amount of food one can get while minimizing
the effort required and minimizing the risk that no food will be
obtained. In one of the least risky, but more prevalent labora-
tory situations that is presented, organisms must choose between
two quantities, and those individuals who are best at discriminat-
ing carefully between the choices and picking the larger one will
net the greatest benefit. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many species are
quite adept at making such relative quantity judgments (for an
overview, see Brannon and Roitman, 2003). These species include
insects (Chittka and Geiger, 1995; Dacke and Srinivasan, 2008),
fish (Agrillo et al., 2007, 2008; Pfifer et al., 2012), amphibians
(Uller et al., 2003; Krusche et al., 2010), birds (Emmerton, 1998;
Rugani et al., 2008), and many mammals including voles (Fer-
kin et al., 2005), dogs (Ward and Smuts, 2007), bears (Vonk and
Beran, 2012), elephants (Irie-Sugimoto et al., 2009; Perdue et al.,
2012), marine mammals (Kilian et al., 2003; Jaakkola et al., 2005;
Abramson et al., 2011), and non-human primates (e.g., Call, 2000;
Beran, 2001, 2004, 2012; Anderson et al., 2005, 2007; Hanus and
Call, 2007; Tomonaga, 2007; Addessi et al., 2008; Evans et al.,
2009).
Recent work in our lab has shown a strong consistency across
species in dealing very adaptively with uncertain or incomplete
information in a quantity judgment task. Beran et al. (2009)
devised a test in which chimpanzees first performed 15 trials in
which they always saw each of two sets of food items, and then
chose between them when they were covered. As expected, the
chimpanzees were consistent in choosing the larger set. The critical
test occurred during the second block of 15 trials in each ses-
sion, when only one set was revealed, whereas the other remained
unknown at the point of choosing. The chimpanzees responded
in that case by basing their choice (or avoidance) of the unknown
quantity on the amount of food in the known quantity. When the
known amount was close to, or exceeded, the average quantity of
items obtained across the first 15 trials, the chimpanzees selected
the known set. But, if the known amount was smaller than the
average, they took the risk of choosing the unknown set. This
strategy occurred across a range of quantities tested across differ-
ent days, and so the chimpanzees showed great flexibility in their
application of this heuristic for dealing with incomplete infor-
mation. In a second study Beran et al. (2012) directly compared
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another primate species, the capuchin monkey, with adult humans,
and the same result occurred in both of these groups, providing
a strong convergence of evidence that multiple primate species
seem to keep a running tally of how well they have been getting
rewarded at the task, and can use that information when it might
be informative.
Despite this clear evidence of flexible responding in the face
of incomplete information, there remain a number of questions
about whether participants would sustain this kind of responding
under different conditions. One can imagine that certain circum-
stances may produce a stronger drive to select the known set over
the unknown set even when the known set is smaller than the
average, for example if the unknown set involved a large degree
of risk. One could manipulate risk by using conditions that kept
shifting the average rates of return during the training trials, and
one could manipulate the potential for extreme gains and losses
for either taking or not taking the known set when faced with an
unknown option. These manipulations would allow one to deter-
mine how robust the heuristic of using the ongoing representation
of averages in quantity assessments is, or whether it is sensitive to
fluctuations and extremes in quantity judgment.
Another likely candidate for disrupting the patterns of respond-
ing found previously would be the introduction of a more com-
petitive circumstance. Often, putting animals in more competitive
versus less competitive situations can change the nature of their
responding to various tasks. For instance, rhesus monkeys have
shown a speed-accuracy trade-off when directly competing against
a partner in a computerized paradigm in comparison to working
alone, suggesting a shift in individual strategy in response to the
altered social nature of the task (Washburn et al., 1990). Moreover,
both chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys have shown sensitivity in
reasoning about another’s potential visual knowledge when placed
in a situation where competition over food sources was likely (e.g.,
Hare et al., 2001; Flombaum and Santos, 2005) but failed to show
this same sensitivity to a conspecific’s perceptual cues in non-
competitive tasks (e.g., Tomasello and Call, 1997; Povinelli, 2000).
Primates also appear to be highly sensitive to the mere likelihood
for competition and alter their expression of knowledge states
in the presence of higher-ranking individuals (Drea and Wallen,
1999). Thus, we tested whether such effects might emerge within
our quantity judgment task.
In a standard competitive task, a salient component would be
the loss of food to a conspecific, either due to direct competition
over the food source or monopolization of the source by a more
dominant animal. To incorporate this aspect of competition, we
modified the test given to capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) by
now giving the unchosen set on every trial to a conspecific who
was near the subject and who did not have to do anything to get
food. Although the subjects were not directly competing for food,
this manipulation should increase the competitive nature of the
task for the subject animal because another individual may some-
times receive the greater quantity of food, and perhaps change the
subject animal’s choice behavior during the trials with incomplete
information. If it did, this would demonstrate that some social
aspects of the environment can disrupt the perceptual and quan-
titative processing and decision-making in non-human animals,
and would reflect an interaction of a “logical” decision-making
process (quantity judgment with ongoing representation of aver-
age rewards) and a social factor driven by competitiveness. In that
case, capuchin monkeys would respond differently in the face of
the exact same quantity comparisons depending on whether a
conspecific got what was left after the choice, or did not (the con-
trol condition). We were rather agnostic as to the direction of this
effect (i.e., whether the monkeys should be more or less likely to
choose the unknown set), but perhaps they should be less likely to
choose the unknown set and potentially lose a better, and initially
visible, outcome to a conspecific.
Giving the unselected food to the conspecific also meant that
the focal monkeys now would see the contents of the unknown set
even when they had not selected that set, and this differed from the
procedure used in Beran et al. (2012). These manipulations should
not have any effect during the first 15 trials, because the subject
monkey would know the contents of both sets, and so should sim-
ply maximize its own reward, but in the second 15 trials, where
risk was introduced and uncertainty was involved, performance
might differ. At the same time, if it did not, this would demon-
strate that the heuristic at work in this species (and, presumably, in
humans and chimpanzees) is robust and not sensitive to disruption
through this particular social manipulation or the manipulation
of showing monkeys what they did not receive on each of these
trials when they selected the known set.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We tested four capuchin monkeys housed at the Language
Research Center (LRC). All monkeys had participated in multi-
ple quantity judgment studies (Beran et al., 2007; Evans et al.,
2009) including the previous study assessing judgments involv-
ing incomplete information (Beran et al., 2012). Each of these
four focal monkeys was paired with a partner monkey that served
as a passive recipient of food in the Conspecific Present con-
dition. The focal monkeys were Wren (female), Griffin (male),
Nala (female), and Liam (male), and they worked with four other
monkeys (Drella, Lily, Gabe, and Logan) that only ever served
to receive the free pellets from the unselected set. The capuchin
monkeys were group housed but voluntarily separated for testing.
Monkeys voluntarily entered individual stainless steel mesh test
boxes (33× 46× 61 cm) that were attached to the group enclo-
sure. There were four test boxes positioned 0.5 m apart in a row.
The focal animal was always shifted into the same test box, and
the partner was shifted into the same adjacent test box during the
partnered condition. While there, both animals had clear visual
and auditory access to one another. All other test boxes remained
empty during test sessions. Water was available ad libitum, and
all monkeys were fed manufactured chow and various fruits and
vegetables daily between 1600 and 1800 h. This study complied
with protocols approved by the Georgia State University IACUC.
All procedures were performed in full accordance with the USDA
Animal Welfare Act and conformed to the “Guidelines for the use
of laboratory animals.”
MATERIALS
The apparatus consisted of a rolling cart topped with a moveable
tray. The cart was positioned in front of the focal test box and the
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tray could be pushed toward the focal animal and pulled back to
the experimenter. There were two food locations on the tray which
could be covered by opaque, removable lids to conceal the contents.
Focal monkeys could reach through holes in the mesh of the text
box or through a Lexan cover with two arm holes to indicate their
choice of one of the two food locations (see Figure 1).
PROCEDURES
Participants had previous experience with a similar quantity judg-
ment task (Beran et al., 2012) and were familiar with the basic
procedures of the task. In all trials of each session, Experimenter
1 baited both locations on the tray with a predetermined number
of food pellets (45 mg, grain-based with banana flavor, Bio-Serv,
Frenchtown, NJ, USA). The locations were baited out of view of
the monkey by tilting the lids upward toward the experimenter,
one at a time, and dropping the items all at once behind them.
Each session consisted of a learning phase immediately followed
by a testing phase.
For the learning phase of each session, focal monkeys were
shown both sets of food items, by uncovering and recovering each
set one at a time. After the presentation, the tray was pushed for-
ward and the monkey made a choice by touching one of the lids
that covered one of the sets of food items. To prevent cuing, Exper-
imenter 1 closed his eyes and looked down while pushing the tray
forward using a centrally located handle, and a second experi-
menter standing to the side of the apparatus (out of direct view of
the monkey) announced the monkey’s choice. The focal monkey
was given the amount of food under the chosen lid. Next, the uns-
elected amount of food was shown to the focal monkey and then
removed in one of two ways. In the Conspecific Absent condition,
the unselected set of food items was returned to an out of sight
food bowl (in the back of the cart). In the Conspecific Present
condition, the unselected food was given to the partner animal in
the adjacent test box, and this event occurred in full view of the
focal monkey (the experimenter paused if the focal animal was
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the test apparatus. The box at right holds the
focal monkey and the tray for presenting the stimulus sets. The conspecific,
when present, was in the other box and received the contents of the
non-selected set.
not watching). It is noteworthy that, in the previous studies of this
kind, the focal participant never viewed the unselected option.
Trials of the testing phase were very similar to those of the learn-
ing phase, except that the focal monkey was only shown one of the
food amounts (always the amount to his or her right), instead of
both amounts as in the learning phase, before being given a choice
between the two options. Thus, the test phase necessarily instilled
uncertainty into the quantity judgments because only one set of
food items could be known with regard to its quantity. The sec-
ond, unrevealed, set could be larger or smaller than the set that
had been seen by the monkey. As noted earlier, these monkeys, as
well as chimpanzees and humans given similar tests, relied on the
approximate mean number of items received across the session’s
learning phase to guide choice of the known or unknown sets in
the test phase (Beran et al., 2009, 2012). When the known set was
smaller than the approximate mean number of items that were
obtained across the learning trials, participants previously showed
a strong bias to select the unknown set (i.e., to risk the known
option to try to get more food). However, when the known set
was close to or larger than the mean, participants selected that set
rather than the unknown option.
We tested monkeys using this procedure in three conditions.
Standard condition
Monkeys were given 15 learning trials and 15 test trials in each
session. Four Conspecific Present and four Conspecific Absent
sessions were conducted for each monkey in an alternating order.
All pairwise comparisons between one and six food pellets were
presented (see Table 1). For each pair of sessions (Conspecific
Absent and Conspecific Present), each pairwise comparison of
pellet amounts was included twice, counterbalanced for side, for
a total of 30 trials and these were randomly distributed across the
Table 1 | Specific quantity comparisons presented in each of the
experimental conditions for each trial type.
Standard
condition
Shifting average
condition
Extreme wins/
losses condition
Learning
trials
Test
trials
Learning trials
(small set)
Test trials
(small set)
Learning
trials
Test
trials
1,2 1,2 0,1 1,3 1,2 2,1
1,3 1,5 1,2 2,5 1,2 2,6
1,4 2,3 1,3 3,1 2,1 3,2
1,5 2,4 1,4 3,6 2,1 3,8
1,6 2,6 2,3 4,1 2,4 5,1
2,3 3,1 2,4 4,2 2,6 5,1
2,4 3,5 2,5 4,6 3,2 5,1
2,5 3,6 3,5 4,8 4,1 5,1
2,6 4,1 3,6 5,2 4,8 5,10
3,4 4,3 4,6 5,8 6,3 5,10
3,5 4,6 4,8 6,4 6,10 5,10
3,6 5,2 5,8 8,5 8,5 5,10
4,5 5,4 – – – 8,2
4,6 6,1 – – – 8,10
5,6 6,5 – – – 10,4
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two sessions. The test trials in this condition consisted of the com-
parisons listed in Table 1, presented in random order. The number
appearing in the leftmost position of each column of Table 1 indi-
cates the number of food items shown to the monkey on every
trial as the first presented set, and the number appearing in the
rightmost position of each column indicates the number of food
items shown in the second presented set (learning trials) or the
number that was placed in the unrevealed set (test trials).
Shifting average condition
In the standard condition, monkeys may have come to expect on
every session that the same average number of items would be
obtained across trials, because the same comparisons were used
in all trials, just in a different order of presentation. Thus, any
potential social influences may have been diminished by a learned
pattern of behavior (i.e., “always choose five items or more”). To
introduce more variability into the task, we varied the average
number of items that would be received in the learning phase of
each session and alternated between a relatively large and small
average across sessions. Twelve learning trials and 12 test trials
were completed in each session. Two Conspecific Present and two
Conspecific Absent sessions were completed by each monkey in
a random order. The smaller average set consisted of the com-
parisons listed in Table 1, repeated twice and counterbalanced for
side. The larger set consisted of the same comparisons multiplied
by two. These test trials oversampled the middle region of values
in order to provide a larger number of critical values for compar-
ison between large-average and small-average sessions. As in the
standard condition, trials were randomly ordered across a session.
Extreme wins/losses condition
To assess the impact of increased wins or losses after a decision,
we ran a third condition in which the payout differential was more
pronounced than in the previous conditions. Specifically, the criti-
cal test trials always involved the presentation of five pellets, which
were paired with either 1 or 10 pellets in the non-visible set. Thus,
choosing the unknown option would result in a large increase in
pellets obtained or a large decrease in pellets obtained, compared
to the known set. Twelve learning trials and 15 test trials were
completed in each session. Three Conspecific Present and three
Conspecific Absent sessions were completed by each monkey in a
random order. The learning and test trials are listed in Table 1, but
were randomly ordered across each session.
RESULTS
As would be expected from these monkeys’ past quantity judg-
ment performance (Beran et al., 2007, 2012; Evans et al., 2009),
the focal monkeys were excellent in choosing the larger of the two
sets of food items when they saw both, during the first trials of
each session. Performance in the training phases of all conditions
is shown in Table 2. Performance was very high in all cases, and
rarely differed between the Conspecific Present and Conspecific
Absent conditions.
The results for the Standard Condition are shown in Figure 2
as the total percentage of trials for all four monkeys in which the
known set was selected. During the training trials, perfect perfor-
mance would have led to an average of 4.4 pellets per trial. The
Table 2 | Percentage of trials selecting the larger quantity by each
monkey during training trials in each condition.
Griffin Wren Liam Nala
Standard
Conspecific present 90.0 86.67 93.3 93.3
Conspecific absent 90.0 90.0 91.67 90.0
Shifting average
Conspecific present 95.83 87.5 100 100
Conspecific absent 87.5 87.5 95.83 91.67
Extreme wins/losses
Conspecific present 83.3 86.1 94.4 97.2
Conspecific absent 83.3 86.1 91.67 94.4
FIGURE 2 | Overall percentage of trials in which the known set was
selected when paired with an unknown set in the Standard test. Data
are shown for all monkeys combined and are separated at each known
quantity into the Conspecific Present and Conspecific Absent conditions.
Bars show the range of responses across the monkeys.
monkeys consistently rejected three or fewer items in the known
set and instead selected the unknown option at levels significantly
higher than chance, all p< 0.05, binomial tests (these and all fur-
ther binomial tests were two-tailed). For four items, they were
indifferent between the two choices in the Conspecific Absent
condition (p> 0.05, binomial test) but significantly preferred the
known set in the Conspecific Present condition (p< 0.05, bino-
mial test). For more than four items, they preferred the known
set at levels greater than chance, all p< 0.05, binomial tests. Chi
square tests for independence showed no difference in the fre-
quency of selection of the known set between the Conspecific
Present and Conspecific Absent conditions for any of the known
quantities [all χ2 (df= 1) <1.70, p> 0.05]. Thus, there was no
effect of unselected sets going to the conspecific or not.
The results for the Shifting Average Condition are shown in
Figure 3A for the smaller range and in Figure 3B for the larger
range. During the training trials for the smaller range, perfect
performance would have led to an average of 4.67 pellets per trial.
Because of the lower trial counts, we combined some of the known
quantity values to contrast low values, intermediate values, and
high values. For test trials in the smaller range, the monkeys con-
sistently rejected three or fewer items in the known set and instead
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selected the unknown option at levels significantly higher than
chance, p< 0.05, binomial test. For four items, they were indiffer-
ent between the two choices in the Conspecific Present condition
and the Conspecific Absent condition (p> 0.05, binomial test).
For more than four items, they showed a preference for the known
set, selecting that set on 16 of 16 trials in the Conspecific Present
condition and 14 of 16 trials in the Conspecific Absent conditions,
both p< 0.01, binomial test. A chi square test for independence
showed no difference in the frequency of selection of the known
set between the Conspecific Present and Conspecific Absent con-
ditions across all known quantities [all χ2 (1, N = 48) <1.00,
p> 0.05].
For the larger range, the pattern was similar. During the train-
ing trials for the larger range, perfect performance would have
led to an average of 8.16 pellets per trial. In test trials of the
larger range, the monkeys preferred the unknown option in both
Conspecific Present and Conspecific Absent conditions when the
known option now was six items or less (both p< 0.01, bino-
mial tests), they were indifferent when the known option had
eight items (both p> 0.05, binomial tests), and they preferred the
known set when it had more than eight items (both p< 0.05, bino-
mial tests). And, again, there was no difference in the frequency
of selection of the known set between the Conspecific Present and
Conspecific Absent conditions across the known quantities [allχ2
(1, N = 48) <1.00, p> 0.05].
The two quantity ranges in this part of the experiment shared
three common quantities (four, six, and eight) that were presented
as the known set, and the choice of those quantities was signifi-
cantly different depending on whether they were presented as part
of the small or large range. For the small range, known sets with
four items were chosen more often than for the large range, χ2
(1, N = 64)= 4.06, p< 0.05. This was also true for known sets of
six items, χ2 (1, N = 24)= 14.18, p< 0.05, and for known sets of
eight items, χ2 (1, N = 40)= 5.38, p< 0.05.
For the Extreme Wins/Losses Condition, the mean number of
items obtained if perfect during the training trials was 5.5 items.
The results for this condition are shown in Figure 4. The mon-
keys consistently rejected five or fewer items in the known set
and instead selected the unknown option at levels significantly
higher than chance, all p< 0.05, binomial tests. For more than five
items, they preferred the known set at levels greater than chance,
all p< 0.05, binomial tests. Once again, there was no difference
in the frequency of selection of the known set between the Con-
specific Present and Conspecific Absent conditions for any of the
known quantities [all χ2 (df= 1) <1.00, p> 0.05].
DISCUSSION
All four focal monkeys performed in a similar manner, and repli-
cated their performance in the earlier experiment on estimating
uncertain outcomes in a quantity judgment task (Beran et al.,
2012). They approached the trials with incomplete information by
responding on the basis of using the approximate average number
of items they had received to that point in the test session (during
the training trials). If the known quantity was smaller than that
amount, they generally gave up that option and instead took the
unknown quantity. If the known amount was as large as, or larger
than, the average, they selected it. As in the previous studies of this
FIGURE 3 | Overall percentage of trials in which the known set was
selected when paired with an unknown set in the Shifting Average
test. (A) Shows performance with the smaller range of quantities, and (B)
shows performance with the larger range of quantities. Bars show the
range of responses across the monkeys.
FIGURE 4 | Overall percentage of trials in which the known set was
selected when paired with an unknown set in the Extreme
Wins/Losses test. Bars show the range of responses across the monkeys.
type (Beran et al., 2009, 2012), this performance was not based
on some absolute value that was always the threshold for selecting
the known set. In the Shifting Average condition, where we could
double or halve the average from session to session, the monkeys
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 492 | 5
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changed their threshold to accompany those changes. This means
that the monkeys did shift their indifference point across the two
ranges, in a manner consistent with continued use of the average
number of items obtained in training (4.67 for the smaller range
and 8.16 items for the larger range if one assumes every training
trial was completed correctly). This demonstrated their flexibil-
ity in using the heuristic to deal with unknown and incomplete
information.
As with the data reported by Beran et al. (2009), it is impor-
tant to note that the arithmetic mean is not the only measure of
central tendency that might be used by non-human animals in
this kind of situation. It is sometimes reported that in tests of
quantity estimation or comparison that animals’ responses are
best accounted for by use of the geometric mean (the square
root of the product of the anchor values; Roberts, 2005; Jordan
and Brannon, 2006; Beran et al., 2008). For the specific quan-
tities in each range we used in this experiment, the geometric
means and the arithmetic means were quite similar (range 1–6:
geometric mean= 2.99, arithmetic mean= 3.5; range 1–8: geo-
metric mean= 3.44, arithmetic mean= 4.14; range 2–16: geomet-
ric mean= 6.89, arithmetic mean= 8.28). Thus, it is difficult to
determine which measure of central tendency might have been
used by the animals. Future research will be needed to better
establish this.
What was novel in the present experiment was the introduction
of a social component to the test, and a highly salient one in terms
of the task setup. Now, on half of the sessions, the focal mon-
key watched as its unchosen set was given to a conspecific, who
was allowed to eat those pellets in full view of the focal monkey.
Although during training trials the focal animal nearly always got
the larger amount, the monkeys still observed and attended to the
smaller amount being given to the conspecific. Also, during trials
with incomplete information, it was possible for the partner ani-
mal to get the larger amount, as when a known set was selected by
the focal animal but the unknown set was larger, or when the focal
monkey selected an unknown set that turned out to be smaller
than the known set.
It was also a new manipulation that the focal monkey now got
to see the unchosen set on test trials where it took the known quan-
tity. In the past, the monkeys never knew what they forewent in
making their selection in the uncertain trials (Beran et al., 2012),
whereas here they could see whether choosing the known quan-
tity ended up being a good choice, or a bad one, in terms of the
amount of food in the unknown set. However, these new aspects
to the methodology appeared to have no effect on the decisions
made by focal monkeys, at least as they pertained to the choice
behavior. However, what is not clear is whether seeing food items
given to other animals might change the “running average” held
by a subject in other circumstances. For example, the monkeys
may have reacted differently if the set given away was unexpect-
edly larger than would have been predicted by what had occurred
to that point in the session. Perhaps more extreme outcomes, cou-
pled with the social manipulation, would change the performance
of monkeys in making these judgments.
Putting animals in tests in which there is actual competition,
the appearance of competition, or even just situations in which
conspecifics are given food for the efforts of the subject, can
change the behavior and performance of the focal subject (e.g.,
Washburn et al., 1990). This can be true even at the level of
judging the perspective of others. For example, chimpanzees and
rhesus monkeys seemed to respond differently in judging other
animals’ visual knowledge when placed in a competitive task ver-
sus a non-competitive task (Tomasello and Call, 1997; Povinelli,
2000; Hare et al., 2001; Flombaum and Santos, 2005). This effect,
however, does not seem to occur for perception of quantity, even
in contexts in which judgments about the likelihood of getting
more food for taking a risk occurs. Rather, the capuchin mon-
keys in this experiment, when faced with incomplete information,
seemed to disregard the presence or absence of a conspecific that
received whatever the subject did not choose. Instead, the mon-
keys sustained what appeared to be an optimal heuristic response
in using the average number of pellets they had been receiving
up to that point in the session as a threshold for making choices
when they could not know both sets. Prior experience from ear-
lier studies along with information feedback may have impacted
the monkeys’ reliance on the heuristic, potentially overshadowing
any deleterious effects of a competitive-like situation. Thus, per-
ception and decision-making in a quantity judgment task appear
to be insulated from any negative effects of a more competi-
tive test environment, although other more overt manipulations
to an animal’s social environment might yet evoke less optimal
responding.
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